In homomorphic encryption schemes, anyone can perform homomorphic operations, and therefore, it is difficult to manage when, where and by whom they are performed. In addition, the property that anyone can "freely" perform the operation inevitably means that ciphertexts are malleable, and it is well-known that adaptive chosen ciphertext (CCA) security and the homomorphic property can never be achieved simultaneously. In this paper, we show that CCA security and the homomorphic property can be simultaneously handled in situations that the user(s) who can perform homomorphic operations on encrypted data should be controlled/limited, and propose a new concept of homomorphic public-key encryption, which we call keyed-homomorphic public-key encryption (KH-PKE). By introducing a secret key for homomorphic operations, we can control who is allowed to perform the homomorphic operation. To construct KH-PKE schemes, we introduce a new concept, a homomorphic transitional universal hash family, and present a number of KH-PKE schemes through hash proof systems. We also present a practical construction of KH-PKE from the DDH assumption. For ℓ-bit security, our DDH-based scheme yields only ℓ-bit longer ciphertext size than that of the Cramer-Shoup PKE scheme.
Introduction

Background and Motivation
In homomorphic encryption schemes, homomorphic operations can be performed on encrypted plaintexts without decrypting the corresponding ciphertexts. Owing to this attractive property, several homomorphic public key encryption (PKE) schemes have been proposed [13, 18, 27] . Furthermore, fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) that allows a homomorphic operation with respect to any circuit, has recently been proposed by Gentry [17] . This has had a resounding impact not only in the cryptographic research community, but also in the business community. One of the reasons for such a big impact is that FHE is suitable for ensuring security in cloud environments (e.g., encrypted data stored in a database can be updated without any decryption procedure).
Improvement in the security of homomorphic encryption will lead to wider deployment of cloud-type applications, whereas the property that anyone can "freely" perform homomorphic operations inevitably means that ciphertexts are malleable. Therefore, it is well-known that adaptive chosen ciphertext (CCA2) security and the homomorphic property can never be achieved simultaneously. In other words, security is sacrificed in exchange for the homomorphic property. Although several previous works (e.g., [1, 6, 19, 28, 29] ) have attempted to construct homomorphic PKE schemes that offer security close to CCA2 security while retaining the homomorphic property, these schemes only guarantee security at limited levels. Note that not all functionalities of conventional homomorphic encryption are indispensable for real-world applications, and therefore there is the possibility of realizing a desirable security level by appropriately selecting the functionalities of conventional homomorphic encryption.
Here, we point out that the underlying cause of the incompatibility of CCA2 security and the homomorphic property, lies in the setting that any user can use the homomorphic property, and it is worth discussing whether the free availability of homomorphic operations is an indispensable functionality in real-world applications. For example, consider the situation where some data encrypted by a homomorphic PKE scheme is stored in a public database (e.g., public cloud computing environment) and it is modified by homomorphic operations. If anyone can perform a homomorphic operation, then it is hard to reduce the risk of unexpected changes to the encrypted data in the database in which resources are dynamically allocated. Even in a closed environment (e.g., private cloud computing environment), we cannot rule out the possibility of unexpected changes to a user's data by any user who is authorized to access the database. Of course, it is possible to protect such unexpected modification of encrypted data by setting access permissions of each user appropriately. However, in cloud environments, security of outsourced data storages may not be assured. Therefore, such access control functionality should be included in encrypted data itself.
From the above consideration, we see that the property that anyone can perform homomorphic operations not only inhibits the realization of CCA2 security, but also introduces the problem of unexpected modification of encrypted data.
Our Contribution
In this paper, we show that CCA2 security and the homomorphic property can be simultaneously handled in situations that the user(s) who can perform homomorphic operations should be controlled. Specifically, we propose a new concept of homomorphic PKE, which we call keyed-homomorphic public-key encryption (KH-PKE), that has the following properties: (1) in addition to a conventional public/decryption key pair (pk, sk d ), another secret key for the homomorphic operation (denoted by sk h ) is introduced, (2) homomorphic operations cannot be performed without using sk h , and (3) ciphertexts cannot be decrypted using only sk h . Interestingly, KH-PKE implies conventional homomorphic PKE, since the latter can be implemented by publishing sk h of KH-PKE.
To construct KH-PKE schemes, we introduce a new concept, a homomorphic transitional universal hash family, which can be constructed from any diverse group system [11] , and present a number of KH-PKE schemes through hash proof systems (HPSs) [11] .
Our Scenarios : Here we introduce situations that the user(s) who can perform homomorphic operations should be controlled/limited. For example, in the situation where encrypted data is stored in a public database, an owner of the data gives sk h to the database manager, who updates the encrypted data after authentication of users. No outsider can modify the encrypted data in the public database without having sk h . As another example, by considering sk h , a counter can take over the role of aggregating an audience survey, voting, and so on. An advantage of separating ballot-counting and ballot-aggregation is that it is possible to reduce the aggregation costs of the counter and to collect the ballot results for individual areas, groups, and communities. We can also consider an application of KH-PKE to prevent illegal distribution of data. A content creator gives sk h to a digital content provider and the provider embeds some data (e.g., a water mark) for protecting the content against illegal copying, a certification for ownership of the content, and/or a distribution route.
Naive Construction and its Limitations : One might think that the functionality and the security of KH-PKE can be achieved by using the following double encryption methodology: A ciphertext of an "inner" CCA1 secure homomorphic PKE scheme is encrypted by an "outer" CCA2 secure PKE scheme, and the decryption key of the CCA2 secure PKE scheme is used as sk h .
However, this naive construction is not secure in the sense of our security definition. Taking into account the exposure of the homomorphic operation key sk h , an adversary can request sk h to be exposed in our security definition. The adversary is allowed to use the decryption oracle "even after the challenge phase", just before the adversary requests sk h . However, no such decryption query is allowed in the CCA1 security of the underlying "inner" scheme, and therefore it seems hard to avoid this problem.
Even if we turn a blind eye to the above problem, it is obvious that efficiency of the naive construction is roughly equal to the total costs of the building block PKE schemes. On the other hand, the efficiency of our KH-PKE instantiations is very close to the corresponding (non-keyed-homomorphic) PKE schemes based on HPSs. In particular, the efficiency of our decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH)-based KH-PKE scheme is comparably efficient as the Cramer-Shoup PKE (CS) scheme [9] , where for ℓ-bit security, our scheme yields only ℓ-bit longer ciphertext size than that of the CS PKE scheme. Whereas the naive construction yields 5ℓ-bit longer ciphertext size even if we choose the Kurosawa-Desmedt PKE scheme [25] and the CramerShoup lite PKE scheme [9] that seems the most efficient combination under the DDH assumption. We give the comparison in Section 5.
To sum up, our construction is superior than the naive construction from both security and efficiency perspectives.
Our Methodology : As a well-known result, CCA2-secure PKE can be constructed via a HPS [11] which has two projective hash families as its internal structure: A universal 2 projective hash and a smooth projective hash. Also it is known that a weaker property of universal 2 , that is called universal 1 property, was shown to be useful for achieving CCA1-secure PKE [24] , and universal 1 property (and smooth property also) does not contradict the homomorphic property. That is, our aim seems to be achieved if we can establish a switching mechanism from universal 2 to universal 1 . Moreover, we can simulate the decryption oracle even after the challenge phase and after revealing sk h since the simulator knows all secret keys in the security proof.
In this paper, we show such a mechanism (which we call homomorphic transitional universal hash family) can be obtained from any diverse group system [11] , and then we propose a generic construction of KH-PKE based on a homomorphic transitional universal HPS. Moreover, as an implication result, KH-PKE is implied by CPA-secure homomorphic PKE (with cyclic ciphertext space) which implies diverse group systems [21] .
We give a formal security definition of KH-PKE which we call KH-CCA security. Note that our generic construction presented in this paper satisfies a relatively weaker version of KH-CCA security. We will give a KH-CCA secure construction in the full version of this paper.
Instantiations : According to our methodology, we present a number of KH-PKE schemes from various major cryptographic assumptions such as the DDH assumption, the decisional composite residuosity (DCR) assumption, the decisional linear (DLIN) assumption, the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption, and the decisional quadratic residuosity (DQR) assumption. This means that it is not difficult to extend all existing HPS to have the homomorphic transitional property, and thus a homomorphic transitional HPS is not a significantly stronger primitive in practice, compared to an ordinary HPS.
In this paper, we present a practical DDH-based KH-PKE scheme. Other KH-PKE schemes based on the DCR assumption and the DQR assumption from the Cramer-Shoup HPSs [11] , based on the DLIN assumption from the Shacham HPS [30] , and based on the DBDH assumption from the Galindo-Villar HPS [15] , and an identity-based analogue of KH-PKE, called keyed-homomorphic identity-based encryption (KH-IBE) and its concrete construction from the Gentry IBE scheme [16] will be given in the full version of this paper.
Related Work
Several previous works have attempted to construct homomorphic PKE schemes that provide security close to CCA2 security, while retaining the homomorphic property. Canetti et al. [6] considered the notion of replayable CCA (RCCA), which leaves a room for an adversary who is given two ciphertexts (C, C ′ ), to gain information on whether C ′ was derived from C. (Modified RCCA notions have also been proposed [19, 28] .) In the RCCA security game, the decryption oracle given to an adversary is restricted in such a way that the challenge ciphertext and ciphertexts derived from the challenge ciphertext cannot be queried to the oracle. Similarly, in benignly-malleable (gCCA) security [1, 31] , ciphertexts related to the challenge one cannot be input to the decryption oracle. Therefore, RCCA and gCCA are strictly weaker notions than CCA2, and may not be sufficient if the encryption scheme is used as a building block for higher level protocols/systems.
In [29] , Prabhakaran and Rosulek proposed homomorphic CCA (HCCA) security, where only the expected operation, and no other operations, can be performed for any ciphertext. (Targeted malleability, which is a similar concept to HCCA, was considered in [4] .) In addition, they also showed that CCA2, gCCA, and RCCA are special cases of HCCA. Note that HCCA does not handle the homomorphic property and CCA2 security simultaneously, since anyone can perform the homomorphic operation. Chase et al. [8] showed that controlled-malleable non-interactive zero-knowledge can be used as a general tool for achieving RCCA and HCCA security.
Embedding a ciphertext of homomorphic PKE into that of CCA2-secure PKE, was considered in [26, 3] . Note that their embedding encryption methods are nothing more than protecting a ciphertext of homomorphic PKE by that of CCA2 PKE, and therefore no homomorphic operation can be performed on embedded ciphertexts. Meanwhile, in our KH-PKE, even after performing the homomorphic operation, a ciphertext is still valid.
Barbosa and Farshim [2] proposed delegatable homomorphic encryption (DHE). The difference between KH-PKE and DHE is that in DHE a trusted authority (TA) issues a token to control the capability to evaluate circuits f over encrypted data M to untrusted evaluators. Furthermore, their security definitions of DHE (input/output privacy (TA-IND-CPA) and evaluation security (IND-EVAL2)) do not allow an adversary to access the decryption oracle and the evaluation oracle (the oracle for homomorphic operation) simultaneously. We note that although Barbosa and Farshim defined verifiability (VRF-CCA2), where no homomorphic operation can be performed without issuing a corresponding token, KH-CCA security for KH-PKE defined in this paper guarantees a similar level of security, since if there exists an adversary that can perform the homomorphic operation without using sk h , then the adversary can break the KH-CCA security.
Preliminaries
In this section, we review the basic notations and definitions related to HPSs (mostly following [11] but slightly customized for our convenience).
Throughout this paper, PPT denotes probabilistic polynomial time. If n is a natural number, then
be sequences of random variables X ℓ and Y ℓ , respectively, defined over a same finite set. As usual, we say that X and Y are statistically (resp. computationally
| is negligible in ℓ for any computationally unbounded (resp. PPT) algorithm A. Furthermore, we say that X and Y are ϵ-close if the statistical distance of X ℓ and Y ℓ is at most ϵ = ϵ(ℓ).
Projective Hash Families : Let X, Π, K, and S be finite, non-empty sets, and L be a proper subset of X (i.e., L ⊂ X and L ̸ = X). Furthermore, let H = {H k : X → Π} k∈K be a collection of hash functions indexed by k ∈ K, and α : K → S be a function. We say that
Let H = (H, K, X, L, Π, S, α) be a projective hash family, and let ϵ ≥ 0. We recall the following properties of a projective hash family: We say that H is ϵ-universal 1 if for all s ∈ S, x ∈ X \ L, and π ∈ Π, it holds that
We say that H is ϵ-universal 2 if for all s ∈ S, x, x * ∈ X \ L with x * ̸ = x, and π, π * ∈ Π, it holds that
We say that H = (H, K, X, L, Π, S, α) is ϵ-smooth if the following two distributions are ϵ-close:
If a projective hash family is ϵ-universal 1 (resp. -universal 2 , -smooth) for a negligible ϵ, then we simply call the projective hash family universal 1 (resp. universal 2 , smooth). 
Subset Membership Problems
and returns x ∈ L and a witness ω ∈ W for x. We say that a subset membership problem M = {I ℓ } ℓ≥0 is hard if the following two distributions are computationally indistinguishable:
Hash Proof System (HPS) : Informally, a HPS is a special kind of (designated-verifier) non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system for a subset membership problem M = {I ℓ } ℓ>0 . A HPS has, as its internal structure, a family of hash functions with the special projective property, and this projective hash family is associated with each instance of the subset membership problems. Although HPS does not treat for all NP languages, HPS leads to an efficient CCA2-secure PKE construction.
As in [11] , we will occasionally introduce an arbitrary finite set E to extend the sets X and
If E is not required (e.g., for a smooth HPS in our construction), then we omit E from the following algorithms. A HPS P = (HPS.param, HPS.priv, HPS.pub),
, provides the following three efficient algorithms:
1. The index sampling algorithm HPS.param takes an instance Λ as input, and returns k ∈ K and s ∈ S such that α(k) = s.
2. The private evaluation algorithm HPS.priv takes Λ ∈ [I ℓ ], k ∈ K and (x, e) ∈ X × E as input, and
3. The public evaluation algorithm HPS.pub takes Λ ∈ [I ℓ ], s ∈ S, x ∈ L, e ∈ E, and a witness ω for x as input, and returns π = H k (x, e) ∈ Π.
We say that P is ϵ-universal
H is an ϵ-universal 1 (resp. ϵ-universal 2 , ϵ-smooth) projective hash family. Note that the homomorphic property of the underlying smooth projective hash family is required in our construction, where for all k ∈ K, and x 1 , x 2 ∈ X, we have
holds. Then, we call this smooth projective hash family homomorphic smooth projective hash family, and also call a smooth HPS homomorphic smooth HPS if the underlying smooth projective hash family has the homomorphic property.
Diverse Group System and Derived Projective Hash Family : Here, we recall the definition of diverse group systems introduced in [11] , which were used to construct projective hash families. Let X, L, and Π be abelian groups, where L is a proper subgroup of X, and Hom(X, Π) be the group of all homomorphisms ϕ :
We recall the projective hash family We call the Eval algorithm commutative if an operation ⊙ is commutative, the distribution of Eval(sk h , C 1 , C 2 ) and that of Eval(sk h , C 2 , C 1 ) are identical. We instantiate DDH/DLIN/DBDH-based KH-PKEs with multiplicative homomorphic operations (⊙ := ×), a DCR-based KH-PKE with additive homomorphic operations (⊙ := +), and a DQR-based KH-PKE with XOR homomorphic operations (⊙ := ⊕). Thus, our concrete instantiations are all commutative schemes.
Next, we define the security notion for KH-PKE, which we call indistinguishability of message under adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (KH-CCA). 
Definition 3.3 (KH-CCA). A KH-PKE scheme is said to be KH-CCA secure if for any PPT adversary A, the advantage
Here, let us remark on the definition of KH-CCA security. Throughout this paper, an adversary who has sk h is called an insider, whereas an adversary who does not have sk h is called an outsider.
In case A does not query the RevHK oracle (i.e., A is an outsider), A is allowed to adaptively issue decryption queries and evaluation queries of any ciphertexts. In particular, in order to capture the malleability in the presence of the homomorphic operation, the Eval oracle allows the challenge ciphertext C * as input. To avoid an unachievable security definition, the Dec oracle immediately answers ⊥ for "unallowable ciphertexts" that are the results of a homomorphic operation for C * and any ciphertext of an adversary's choice. Such unallowable ciphertexts are maintained by the list D.
The situation that the Dec oracle does not answer for ciphertexts that are derived from the challenge ciphertext C * might seem somewhat analogous to the definition of RCCA security [6] . However, there is a critical difference between KH-CCA and RCCA: In the RCCA security game, the Dec oracle does not
That is, the functionality of the Dec oracle is restricted regardless of the adversary's strategy. On the other hand, in the KH-CCA security game, in case an adversary selects the strategy that it does not submit C * to the Eval oracle, the restriction on the Dec oracle is exactly the same as the CCA2 security for ordinary PKE scheme, and it is one of the adversary's possible strategies whether it submits C * to the Eval oracle, and thus the adversary has more flexibility than in the RCCA game.
If an outsider A becomes an insider after A obtains the challenge ciphertext C * , then A is not allowed to issue a decryption query after obtaining sk h via the RevHK oracle. In other words, A is allowed to issue a decryption query until right before obtaining sk h , even if C * is given to A. This restriction is again to avoid a triviality. (If A obtains sk h , A can freely perform homomorphic operations over the challenge ciphertexts, and we cannot meaningfully define the "unallowable set" of ciphertexts.)
Note that we can show that any KH-CCA secure PKE scheme satisfies CCA1 (thus CPA also) security against an adversary who is given (pk, sk h ) in the setup phase. Showing this implication is possible mainly due to the RevHK oracle that returns sk h to an adversary, and the Dec oracle in the KH-CCA game. Here, we explain how the implication of KH-CCA security to CCA1 security is proved. Let A be a CCA1 adversary. Using A as a building block, we can construct a reduction algorithm B that attacks KH-CCA security, as follows: First, B is firstly given pk. Then B asks the RevHK oracle to obtain sk h , and runs A with input (pk, sk h ). Wnen A sends a ciphertext C as a decryption query, B forwards C as B's decryption query. 
Definition 3.4 (Weak KH-CCA). A KH-PKE scheme is said to be weak KH-CCA secure if for any PPT adversary A, the advantage Adv
Generic Construction via Homomorphic Transitional Universal HPS
In this section, we give a generic construction of KH-PKE from an enhanced variant of universal HPS, which we call homomorphic transitional universal HPS. A homomorphic transitional universal HPS has, as its internal structure, a family of hash functions which we call transitional universal projective hash family.
Homomorphic Transitional Universal Projective Hash Families
Informally, a projective hash family H = (H, K, X, L, Π, S, α) is said to be a transitional universal projective hash family if an index k ∈ K for specifying a hash function from the family can be divided into two components as (k ′ , k), and even if k is exposed, it still yields the universal 1 property.
, and (2) Considering the probability space defined by choosing 
n be an injective function, where p is the smallest prime dividing |X/L|, and n is sufficiently large enough for Γ to be injective. For
, and e ∈ E, H is defined as:
where (γ 1 , . . . , γ n ) = Γ(x, e). Cramer and Shoup showed that the CS projective hash family H is (1/ p)-universal 2 . Note that since H k = ϕ ∈ Hom(X, Π), the basic projective hash family H derived from the diverse group system satisfies the homomorphic property, namely for all k ∈ K, and x 1 , x 2 ∈ X, we have
Next, we show that it is in fact a homomorphic transitional universal projective hash family. 
, and consider the probability space is defined by choosing k ′ ∈ K at random. Then, H still provides the (1/ p)-universal 1 property, because the projective hash family H is a (1/ p)-universal 1 and the output of H is "masked" by the output of H. Furthermore, for all (
i H ki (x 1 ) and
, where (γ 
Generic Construction of KH-PKE
Here, we give the proposed construction of a KH-PKE scheme based on a homomorphic transitional universal HPS given in the previous subsection, a homomorphic smooth projective HPS, and a universal 2 projective HPS. We note that all of the projective hash families used in our construction can be constructed from a diverse group system [11] . Therefore, our proposed construction is fairly generic.
We set E = Π (Π is an abelian group, for which we use additive notation) and Γ : X × Π → Π n is an injective function, where n is a natural number which is sufficiently large so that Γ is injective. Moreover, let
n also be an injective function defined by the same manner. Let M = {I ℓ } ℓ≥0 be a subset membership problem which specifies an instance description Λ = Λ[X, L, W, R] ∈ [I ℓ ]. We will use the following three kinds of projective hash families H, H and H and corresponding HPS (for M). Using these building blocks, we construct a KH-PKE scheme as in Figure 1. • H = (H, K, X, L, Π, S, α) is a homomorphic smooth and projective hash family. Let P = (HPS.param, HPS.priv, HPS.pub) be a homomorphic smooth projective HPS for M which associates the instance Λ with H. •
is the CS (homomorphic transitional universal) projective hash family that we showed in the previous subsection (with the index space K is divided into K 1 = K and K 2 = K n ). Let P = ( HPS.param, HPS.priv, HPS.pub) be a homomorphic transitional universal HPS for M which associates Λ with H. Roughly, the homomorphic smooth projective hash family H is used to hide a plaintext in a ciphertext. Moreover the universal 2 projective property of H and H is used to detect the invalidity of ciphertexts, which leads to resistance against ciphertext modification, and thus is contradictory to the homomorphic property that inherently involves such modification. By using the homomorphic transitional property of H, H can be "transitioned" into a universal 1 projective hash family with the homomorphic property. One might think that in the contraction, H is redundant, and thus is not necessary. However, this is not true. Namely, if H is removed, then the adversary can extract meaningful information from the Eval oracle by submitting an invalid ciphertexts, and therefore, the resulting scheme becomes insecure. In other words, with the help of H, the Eval oracle can distinguish invalid ciphertexts from valid ones, and consequently, the above attack is prevented.
To see the correctness for the Eval algorithm, suppose that Eval receives correctly generated ciphertexts C 1 = (x 1 , e 1 , π 1 , π 1 ) and C 2 = (x 2 , e 2 , π 2 , π 2 ) of plaintexts M 1 and M 2 , respectively. Let M = M 1 + M 2 . Then, by recalling the homomorphic and transitional properties, the following holds:
Since all of the projective hash families used in our construction can be constructed from a diverse group system, from the result of [21] (where CPA-secure homomorphic PKE (with cyclic ciphertext space) implies diverse group systems), the following corollary is given. We give the proof of Theorem 4.1 as follows.
Proof. Let A be an adversary who breaks weak KH-CCA security. To later calculate the concrete advantage of A, let ϵ(ℓ), ϵ(ℓ), and ϵ(ℓ) be negligible functions such that P be ϵ(ℓ)-smooth, and P be homomorphic transitional ( ϵ(ℓ), ϵ(ℓ))-universal, and P be ϵ(ℓ)-universal 2 . 
, and sk h = ( k, k). This game sends pk to A. In find stage, this game answers for each query as follows: For a decryption query C, this game runs Dec(sk d , C) as usual using sk d , and returns the result of the decryption algorithm. For an evaluation query (C 1 , C 2 ), this game runs Eval(sk h , C 1 , C 2 ) as usual using sk h , and returns the result of the evaluation algorithm. For the reveal homomorphic key query, this game returns sk h = ( k, k). 
In the challenge phase, A sends (M
* 0 , M * 1
Game 1:
Recall that in Game 0, the evaluation oracle rejects a query (x, e, π, π) if H k (x, e, π) ̸ = π. In this game, in addition to these rules, we make the evaluation oracle rejects a query that contains a ciphertext (x, e, π, π) satisfying (x, e, π) = (x * , e * , π * ) but π ̸ = π * . Due to the projective property of H, π is uniquely determined by k and its input (x, e, π). Thus, a ciphertext (x * , e * , π * , π ̸ = π * ) is obviously invalid. Again, recall that in Game 0, the decryption oracle rejects a query (x, e, π, π) if either
Here, the decryption oracle also rejects a query that contains a ciphertext (x, e, π, π) 
Game 2:
Recall that in Game 1, the challenge ciphertext is computed by using the public evaluation algorithm. In this game, the challenge ciphertext is computed by using the private evaluation algorithm. Since this change is purely conceptual, Pr[T (2) ℓ ] = Pr[T 
ℓ ]| is equal to the advantage AdvDist(ℓ) of the simulator as a distinguisher for the subset membership problem, which is negligible by the assumption.
Game 4:
In addition to the previous rejection rules, in this game we make the decryption/evaluation oracle rejects a query that contains a ciphertext (x, e, π, π) satisfying x ̸ ∈ L. Let F 4 be the event that either (1) the decryption oracle rejects a query (x, e, π, π) with x ̸ ∈ L, but either H k ′ , k (x, e) = π or H k (x, e, π) = π holds, or (2) the evaluation oracle rejects a query ((x 1 , e 1 , π 1 , π 1 ), (x 2 , e 2 , π 2 , π 2 ) ) either "x 1 ̸ ∈ L and H k (x 1 , e 1 , π 1 ) = π 1 " or "x 2 ̸ ∈ L and H k (x 2 , e 2 , π 2 ) = π 2 " hold.
In the find phase, α(k ′ , k) = s and α( k) = s are fixed. Then, the probability that
, since H is a ϵ-universal 2 (or ϵ-universal 1 projective, if A has been an insider via the RevHK oracle) hash family, and the probability that H k (x, e, π) = π is at most ϵ(ℓ), since H is a ϵ-universal 2 hash family. In the challenge phase, π
* , π * ) are fixed. After this, in the guess stage, the probability that H k ′ , k (x, e) = π is at most ϵ(ℓ), since H is a ϵ-universal 2 . Note that if A has been an insider, then A does not issue the decryption query. In addition, the probability that
The term 2Q eval (ℓ) is derived from the fact that an evaluation query contains two ciphertexts.
From the fact that Game 3 and Game 4 are identical if the event F 4 does not occur, we get Pr[T
Game 5: Due to the previous game hopping, it is guaranteed that no information of secret keys is revealed from an invalid ciphertext (x, e, π, π) where x ̸ ∈ L. Therefore, the smooth property can be used in this game.
So, this game chooses
Since H is an ϵ(ℓ)-smooth projective hash family and β is hidden by π * , we get Pr[T
By combining the inequalities, we get Adv
, which is negligible.
Practical Weak KH-PKE Construction from DDH
In this section, we present an efficient DDH-based KH-PKE construction. This scheme is not a mere combination of the generic construction of KH-PKE in Section 4 and the transitional HPS from DDH (which will appear in the full version), but introduces additional techniques for enhancing efficiency. Remarkably, efficiency of our scheme is only slightly lower than the Cramer-Shoup encryption in spite of its complicated functionality. In particular, ciphertext length of our scheme is only ℓ-bit larger than that of the CramerShoup scheme, where ℓ is the security parameter. For example, for 128-bit security, ciphertext overhead of our scheme is 896-bit while that of the Cramer-Shoup scheme is 768-bit (assuming that these schemes are implemented over elliptic curves).
Techniques for Improving Efficiency
Before going into the concrete construction of our DDH-based KH-PKE scheme, we briefly explain two additional techniques for enhancing efficiency which are not mentioned in the previous sections. Both these techniques employ target collision resistant (TCR) hash functions [10] , and can also be applicable to other various (standard) PKE schemes. k1,0, k1,1), ( k0, k1, k1,0, k1,1) ) sk h ← (( k1,0, k1,1), ( k0, k1, k1,0, k1,1) )
The first technique is just the same as the popular method for transforming hash-free variant of the Cramer-Shoup scheme into the TCR-based one (i.e., the standard Cramer-Shoup scheme). Due to it, the size of the public key is significantly reduced.
The second technique is to compress the redundant part of the ciphertext by using a TCR hash function 1 . Interestingly, our security proof still works even if one of ciphertext components (specifically, a component for validity checking upon the homomorphic operation) is hashed to be a smaller value. It is a bit surprising that this technique can be also applied to the original Cramer-Shoup scheme, but to the best of our knowledge, it has never explicitly been stated in the literatures. When applying our technique to the Cramer-Shoup scheme, ciphertext length of the resulting scheme becomes the same as that of the Kurosawa-Desmedt (KD) scheme [25] which is the best known DDH-based PKE scheme. We should also note that this technique is not applicable to other similar schemes such as the Cash-Kiltz-Shoup [7] , Hanaoka-Kurosawa [20] , and Kiltz schemes [23] . This fact is primarily due to the structure of HPS-based constructions, and thus, it is difficult to apply the above technique to PKE schemes from other methodology, e.g. [5, 20, 22] .
Practical KH-PKE from DDH
Here, we give a description of our KH-PKE instantiation (using our technique of reducing the ciphertext size). First, we define the DDH assumption as follows. log p/2 . We give our DDH-based KH-PKE scheme in Figure 2 . Here, we explain the usage of sk h =
holds. Therefore, the Eval algorithm works. The other keys ( k 0 , k 1 , k 1,0 , k 1,1 ) (and f ) are used for computing π ′ 1 (resp. π ′ 2 ) to check the validity of C 1 (resp. C 2 ).
The following theorem can be proved in the same way as Theorem 1. We give the proof of Theorem 5.1 as follows.
Proof. We define the sequences of games as follows: Let T i be the event that β ′ = β in Game i.
Game 0:
The same as the KH-CCA game.
Game 1:
This game modifies the way to compute C * as follows:
Since this change is purely conceptual, 
, and set pk ← (hk 1 , hk 2 
A is given pk. For a decryption query and an evaluation query (in both find and guess stages), B answers as usual using sk d and sk h , respectively.
In the challenge phase, A sends (M *
, and returns
This game modifies the decryption and evaluation oracles, so that these reject all ciphertexts such that (g 1 , x 0 , x 1 ) is not a DDH tuple, as follows: 
log g0 π is uniform over Z p . So, Pr[X Table 1 , we give an efficiency comparison of our DDH-based KH-PKE scheme with the CS PKE [9] , the KD PKE [25] , and the naive construction (See Section 1). We note that these three schemes do not yield keyed-homomorphic property and/or (weak) KH-CCA security. As seen in Table 1 , our scheme is comparably efficient to the best known DDH-based (standard) PKE schemes, i.e. the CS and the KD schemes, in terms of both ciphertext overhead and computational costs. Especially, ciphertext overhead of our scheme is only ℓ-bit longer than that of the CS scheme for ℓ-bit security. It is somewhat surprising that it is possible to realize KH property with only significantly small additional cost. Furthermore, comparing with the naive construction (from KD and CS(-lite)) which appears to have KH property (but does not satisfy weak KH-CCA security), we see that our scheme is more efficient. This means that our methodology does not only yield KH property (and weak KH-CCA security) but also significantly high efficiency. 
